Normalizing ties with Syria must not be a blank check – JPost Piece

Note: The following article was originally published in the Jerusalem Post.

Israel and Syria currently face an opportunity for détente for the first time in decades. The collapse of Assad, shifting regional alliances, and a weakened Iran open the door to new possibilities amidst an atmosphere of geopolitical change signal a rare chance for the governments of al-Sharaa and Netanyahu to move towards peace.

Tensions between Israel and Syria stem from the founding of the Jewish state in 1948, when Syria joined other Arab states in the region in declaring war on Israel after rejecting the United Nations Partition plan that year. Grounded in pan-Arabist ideology espoused by figures like Michel Aflaq, Syria’s Ba’ath leadership viewed Zionism as a colonial affront to Arab unity and identity. This hostility was institutionalized over time, culminating in systematic persecution of Syria’s Jewish community and deepening state animosity in the years leading up to and following the Six-Day War of 1967.

Israel’s decisive military victory dealt a severe blow to Syria so severe, particularly with the loss of the Golan Heights, the Ba’ath regime was humiliated by the loss and saw its legitimacy challenged. In 1973, Syria coordinated with Egypt to launch a surprise attack on Israel to reclaim the Golan—however, the failure to secure victory and reclaim territory in the Yom Kippur War only deepened animosity. In the following decades, Hafez al-Assad’s government sponsored Palestinian militant groups in the Bekaa valley and strengthened ties with Iran, including actors such as Hezbollah.

Damascus’s sponsorship of anti-Israel militant groups, alignment with Israel’s regional adversaries like Iran, and repeated military confrontations left little room for trust and influenced Israel’s full annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981. Despite the 1974 disengagement agreement and deployment of the UN Disengagement Observer Force, the Golan’s commanding high ground over northern Israel —alongside Israeli settlements and a sizable Druze community—reinforced the case for full incorporation. While many Druze opposed the annexation, some viewed Israeli governance as preferable to the repression under Assad.

The annexation of the Golan Heights remains one of the most critical points of contention between Israel and Syria. Both the United Nations and Syria consider the move illegitimate, with Damascus demanding full Israeli withdrawal and demilitarization of the territory. Israel insists on retaining part of the Golan for its security. The inability to reconcile these opposing positions was a key factor in the collapse of peace negotiations in the 1990s.

The Syrian Civil War fragmented the country’s territorial integrity and paved the way for a fundamentally different Syria. Bashar al-Assad’s failure to prevent the state’s collapse fueled widespread instability and allowed foreign actors to dominate. Iran, working through Shiite militias and IRGC-linked Hezbollah, helped murder hundreds of thousands in its bid to help Assad maintain control. Amid this chaos, Israel still managed to work with Assad’s main backer, Russia, to broker deconfliction arrangements that enabled Israeli airstrikes to target Iranian military infrastructure and proxies. The collapse of Assad’s regime and the emergence of Ahmed al-Sharaa now alters this strategic calculus.

The new leadership in Damascus now governs a state in transition that faces a considerable number of challenges domestically. Sectarian tensions between Alawites, Sunni Muslims, Druze, and Christians are escalating. The Alawite massacre in the northwest earlier this year, ongoing kidnappings and targeted attacks against Christians and Kurds, and renewed clashes in the Druze-majority south have undermined public confidence. Israel has valid reasons to remain cautious of al-Sharaa’s Islamist government with multiple jihadists groups acting with relative impunity across parts of the country.

Although Assad’s rule was deeply hostile to the Jewish nation, the previous status quo allowed for predictable deterrence through Russian mediation. Now with both Assad and Moscow absent, Israeli security planners fear that Syria could once again become a launchpad for cross-border attacks or a haven for international terrorism. In response, Israel has preemptively targeted strategic military infrastructure and crossed into areas like Mount Hermon and Daraa to contain potential spillover, as Jerusalem now seeks a new way forward.

While rapprochement appears possible between Damascus and the Kurdish leadership in Rojava (DAANES), Israel remains concerned about the uncertain trajectory of Druze integration and the persistent threat posed by emboldened extremists. The Kurds also remain concerned of Damascus’ insistence on centralization and the threat posed from another government disinterested in protecting their rights. This raises a fundamental question: Why should Israel consider normalizing relations with a fragmented state?

Despite valid concerns, there are four compelling reasons Israel should pursue normalization with Syria.

First, Syria is no longer beholden to the geopolitical dictates of Russia and Iran. Al-Sharaa’s government seeks legitimacy in a region of shifting alliances that Israel has an opportunity to take advantage of by forging a new security arrangement with Damascus. Intelligence cooperation could help both states counter terrorism and limit Iranian influence.

Second, Syria’s devastated economy and urgent need for reconstruction make international investment essential. With a GDP of $513.6 billion compared to Syria’s $23.6 billion, Israel can offer infrastructure expertise and investment partnerships, including opportunities for Israeli firms to build networks to attract clients.

Third, normalization would allow for a formal resolution of the Golan Heights issue and facilitate the integration of Druze communities on both sides of the border. For Israel, this means not only enhanced border security but also the stabilization of minority communities while for Damascus, it means reclaiming lost legitimacy and ending decades of conflict over its southern frontier.

Fourth, normalization offers Israel leverage to shape Syria’s internal trajectory. Israeli concerns about renewed violence against minorities—Kurds, Druze, and Alawites—cannot be ignored. Normalization must not be a blank check for Damascus to pursue repression. Instead, engagement should be conditional: Normalization should be tied to measurable improvements in minority integration and internal stability. Jerusalem can pressure Damascus to pursue this. A strategic partnership requires accountability–not a validation of autocracy and extremism.

Arab states are increasingly normalizing relations with Israel in pursuit of mutual economic benefit and stability. Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Sudan have already benefited diplomatically and reaped commercial dividends through normalization. Saudi Arabia will likely follow soon. If Syria’s new leadership seeks legitimacy and reintegration into the regional order, then it must align with this trajectory, sign a formal peace agreement and recognize Israel as a reality. Those seeking peace between these nations should support the idea of normalization through clear eyes and work together to make this a reality.

Normalization must reshape Syria, not crown a jihadist as statesman.

Written by Anthony Avice Du Buisson (07/14/2025)